


# Towards a shared vision of peace, security, migration and climate change in Africa



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## ABSTRACT

*Increasing evidence indicates that climate change is likely to exacerbate anxieties and dangers, leading to heightened conflict and fragility. Climate change may exacerbate food insecurity and encourage climate-related migration, so damaging socioeconomic systems and increasing the likelihood of conflicts over diminishing natural resources. Many drought-affected communities are contending with the compounded impacts of additional crises, such as insecurity, war, and the consequences of climate change, including food insecurity, flooding, and drought. This study, informed by a systematic literature analysis, demonstrates the necessity for communal solutions to address protection issues related to human mobility in the aftermath of the adverse effects of catastrophes and climate change, even when normative and legal instruments are utilised. This situation necessitates a thorough analysis and comprehension of natural mobility patterns, underlying reasons, coordination among key stakeholders, and active involvement in material distribution, capacity enhancement, community engagement, and protection oversight. This study elucidates the human mobility problems associated with climate change and catastrophes, offering recommendations that serve as a foundation for stakeholders addressing this complex issue, ultimately striving towards the shared goal of minimising impacts and safeguarding the most vulnerable populations.*

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## Introduction

The FAO (2022a) indicates that conflict remains a major contributor to acute food insecurity. In 2021, about 70% of the worldwide population experiencing food security crises resided in areas where conflict was the primary cause of food insecurity (FAO, 2022b). The ICRC (2020) emphasised that concurrently, approximately 60% of the 20 states most susceptible to the impacts of climate change are embroiled in violent conflicts (ICRC, 2020). Specifically, 142 million families and 527 million individuals residing in unstable or conflict-affected regions urgently require financial assistance and interventions for climate adaptation (Läderach et al., 2021). The various impacts of risks stemming from climate change, conflict, and fragility undermine resilience, perpetuating a cycle of escalating food insecurity, hunger, poverty, and further conflict and fragility. Consequently, it is imperative to disrupt this detrimental cycle amid the escalating climate problem. Somalia has seen three decades of conflict, resulting in significant deforestation and the biggest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) globally. As of August 2022, there were over 2.97 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and more than 630,000 Somalis were refugees, primarily residing in Ethiopia and Kenya (Roberts, 2023). The causes of relocation are interconnected and intricate, primarily associated with climate and war shocks, including floods and droughts. A definitive causal relationship between conflict and climate change is absent, rendering the issue contentious (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Nonetheless, an emerging body of evidence indicates that climate change can exacerbate security vulnerabilities (Scheffran et al., 2019). In regions plagued by entrenched disputes or tensions, the fight for scarce resources significantly heightens the danger of escalating violence and discord. Climate variability exacerbates threats in numerous African nations, where risks of fragility intersect. Most climate hotspots are located in conflict zones. The ICRC (2020) indicates that 60% of nations deemed extremely susceptible to climate change are afflicted by war globally. In Africa, numerous conflicts are fundamentally rooted in the battle for access to and control of land and other natural resources (AfDB, 2022a). The regions and nations experiencing tension are very susceptible to the

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effects of climate change due to their constrained adaptive capacities, which are hindered by conflict that disrupts societal structures, undermines development, intensifies poverty, and exacerbates inequities. The natural environment is frequently inadvertently harmed or directly assaulted during war (AfDB & IOM, 2023). These assaults may pollute soil, water, and land, and inadvertently or deliberately harm species. Access to water is often politicised in larger conflicts. Conflict-affected nations exhibit diminished capacity for sustained climate adaptation planning and tend to allocate their resources predominantly to economic or security issues. Conflict often constrains their ability to maintain critical infrastructure, protect ecosystems, conduct diplomacy, and manage resources. Conflict impedes individuals' capacity to formulate mobility options in response to the effects of climate change (ICRC, 2020).

Climate change in certain locations has modified ecosystems and disrupted transhumance patterns. Pastoralists frequently must relocate differently or to greater distances than previously to find appropriate grazing lands or water for their cattle, including crossing international borders (ICRC, 2020). In other instances, pastoralists who earlier relocated to uncultivated regions are now advancing towards cultivated fields. Similarly, certain farmers have acquired pastureland. This erodes community cohesion, incites discord between herders and farmers, or exacerbates pre-existing disputes (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Typically, these conflicts arise in fragile regimes that are unable to intervene and resolve intercommunal disputes or enforce land use restrictions. Furthermore, the legitimacy of traditional authorities, which have typically facilitated the governance of transhumance routes or the resolution of conflicts, has diminished in certain regions (AfDB & IOM, 2023). The majority of internally displaced persons reside in unstable conditions, either in urban slums or provisional camp accommodations. Living conditions may be arduous, characterised by elevated unemployment rates, poverty, inadequate sanitation, criminal activity, and social marginalisation (IOM, 2017). The emergency resulting in internal displacement, conflict, or disaster often reveals a nation's inadequate capacity for intervention. Many of these regions are susceptible to natural shocks and hazards, resulting in abnormally high vulnerability and inadequate capability for mobility or adaptation. IDPs fleeing violence have suffered significant impacts of climate change in urban or camp environments, leading to secondary displacement (ICRC, 2020). Others came home post-displacement, only to discover that floods had obliterated their residences. This study seeks to establish a collective vision and comprehension of the interconnections among climate change, peace and security, and migration. The study seeks to establish policies and offer guidance that confronts the identified difficulties, thereby fostering sustainable futures through community responsibility.

Climate change has emerged as the contemporary environmental term, denoting the fluctuations in the current climate mostly induced by human activity, hence termed anthropogenic. This may be the most serious environmental challenge confronting the modern global population (Moser & Dilling, 2004), although it is not unprecedented (Vlassopoulos, 2012). Since the emergence of climate change discourse in the early 19th century until the late 20th century, it was exclusively a subject of debate within the scientific community (Vlassopoulos, 2012; Seacrest et al., 2000) and only entered the public agenda in the mid-to-late 1980s (Seacrest et al., 2000; Moser, 2010). It has been established that human activities have severely impacted the global climate, posing significant hazards to socio-economic and physical infrastructures. Conversely, sceptics have presented substantial evidence to refute the anthropogenic origins of climate change (Rahman, 2013). Furthermore, advocates of climate change have contemplated appropriate strategies for addressing this pressing concern. Consequently, with increasing public engagement in the climate change discourse and heightened knowledge of the associated uncertainties and risks, the issue has been scrutinised and contested from multiple viewpoints. Despite ongoing discussions over the urgency, extent of change, and strategies to address emerging dangers, there is unanimous agreement that the climate has been undergoing a transformative trajectory since the Earth's inception (IPCC, 2007). The narrative of climate change reveals a transformation in perspectives about its discussion and characterisation across time (Vlassopoulos, 2012). This paper adopts a novel perspective on climate change, giving evidence derived from an investigation of its implications within a framework that connects migration, peace, and security, particularly in Africa.

This study seeks to establish a foundation for stakeholders addressing this complex issue and advancing towards a shared goal of alleviating and safeguarding the most vulnerable populations.

## **Literature review**

The nexus between climate change, peace and security, and human mobility refers to the trans-spatial interaction between climate-security-mobility (including displacement and migration) and conflict dynamics, which reveals itself through a complex labyrinth of pathways (AfDB & IOM, 2023). The African Development Bank (AfDB) Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022-2026 (AfDB, 2022) describes fragility as a situation whereby the exposure to external or internal pressures surpasses prevailing capacities to respond to, prevent and recuperate from them, creating instability risks. In 2020, countries experiencing fragility and conflict were occupied by 3% of the African population, accounting for 48% of people in extreme poverty (AfDB & IOM, 2023). The AfDB and International Organisation for Migration (IOM) underline that those nations that have encountered fragility for a long time face higher food insecurity and poverty, wide infrastructural and public services gaps, undiversified economies and profound institutional deficits. Fragility is not restricted to a particular group of nations but epitomises a spectrum of situations that can affect any country to various extents and in different ways (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Increasing climate change causes the same threats as other stresses and shocks. It may outstrip the institutional capacity to address these shocks and contribute to forced displacement, conflict and political crises (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Most of the African countries that have been stricken by fragility and conflict are also hotspots for climate change. In other cases, conflict and disaster-related displacements overlay (IOM, 2021). Climate change adaptation requires primarily cultural, economic and social resources. The ICRC (2020) argues that fragile countries

have less ability to manage conflict, develop and maintain infrastructure, protect ecosystems, and manage natural resources (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Some countries most vulnerable to climate change in Africa have weak rules of law and governance and are prone to conflict. Their economies are based on undiversified agriculture (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Increasing tensions over resources through growing populations and environmental threats threaten to disengage development gains, overstrain weak states, and worsen fragile conditions. The impacts of climate intersect with stressors and non-climate drivers to worsen vulnerabilities (AfDB, 2021). The degree to which climate risks lead to migration or displacement is contingent upon an individual and community's vulnerability and exposure (AfDB & IOM, 2023).

The negative impacts of climate change and associated shocks are already present in the southern and eastern parts of Africa (Schraven et al., 2020). Whilst rainfall variability, water scarcity and droughts have, for instance, steadily been prominent in the West African Sahel, several countries in East Africa, like Ethiopia, Kenya and the Darfur region, have been experiencing drought-induced famines, loss of livestock owing to pasture and water scarcity, and also grappling with farmer-herder tensions (Schraven et al., 2020). Besides rising temperatures over and above the worldwide average, in Southern Africa, the rural economies that are primarily climate-dependent have been negatively affected by climate change (Conway & Schipper, 2011). For instance, big cities in South Africa like Durban and Cape Town have recently been facing severe climate change-induced drought and related water scarcity. Meanwhile, although the continued human mobility from one place to the other has conventionally been due to social organisation and people's experiences across African communities, it is broadly believed that climate change and associated shocks would further cause new upsurges of displacement, planned relocation and increased migration. This can potentially exacerbate fragile security situations and latent conflicts in some African regions (Schraven et al., 2020). In response, many vulnerable communities and people may fail to migrate due to a lack of social, financial or physical assets needed to enable movement. (Conway & Schipper, 2011).

Despite the progress made at the international level in the attempts at dealing with the impacts of climate change on human mobility, some understanding of circumstances and insights into how far climate change will or has affected vulnerable people are absent (Conway & Schipper, 2011). As such, the likely increase in mobility trends in Southern Africa, West and East, is critical to influencing a development-oriented approach towards peace, security, and human mobility in the wake of climate change (Schraven et al., 2020). However, currently, strategic approaches in Africa to managing migration, decreasing internal displacement and realising participatory, transparent and relocation, which is demand-oriented, are missing. Apart from the effect on food security, water scarcity induced by drought, human mobility and competition for scarce natural resources, as demonstrated in the Lake Chad region, cyclical droughts have been the main driver of conflicts between farmers and herders and inter-state conflicts on the transboundary usage of water resources (Cabot, 2017; Brown & Crawford, 2008). The case of the Darfur conflict illustrates that the shrinkback of Lake Chad may stoke further Boko Haram activities across the region (Schraven et al., 2020). Over the years, the social systems and Sahelian livelihoods have adapted to extremes and climate variability, as shown in the diversification of livelihood, pastoralism, and mobility. However, the impact of water scarcity and drought on livestock production and food will contribute not only to the increasing number of IDPs but also aggravate the situation of environmental scarcity and food insecurity in the continent (Giannini et al., 2017; Hammer, 2004). Additionally, with violent conflicts between herders and farmers or water conflicts also increasingly becoming widespread daily, the propensity for these conflicts to ignite or foment latent conflicts will be good. This will also have consequences for Africa's stability and fragile security situation.

Climate mobility and climate impacts can pressure border communities to endure underinvestment, instability, and violence (ACMI, 2023; IOM, 2024). Many borderlands in Africa are already harbouring IDPs and refugees. IDP and refugee camps are frequently located alongside the borders as authorities aim to contain these populations closer to their homes (ACMI, 2023). African communities usually accommodate newcomers and have a norm of peaceful coexistence. However, in several borderland spaces, conflict and climate dynamics interconnect. Different forms of cattle rustling, illicit trade, and state border security systems make crossing the border dangerous for pastoralists (ACMI, 2023). Restrictive border rules set herders in spaces where they are more vulnerable and exposed than if they had an opportunity to migrate. This risks them into tension with national authorities, pastoralist groups, or settled communities (Penu & Paolo, 2021). It will be critical to appreciate how the impacts of climate change could increase conflicts and the possibility of political violence in some border areas. For instance, the border of Mali and Burkina Faso has seen the intensification of tensions in past years as Islamist groups became active in this expanse. Camps for refugees and IDPs across these frontiers are expected to see people exit in the next 30 years in response to the effects of climate change, a tendency that could be enhanced by conflict (Penu & Paolo, 2021). For example, about 133,000 people are anticipated to exit the border between Burkina Faso and Mali (ACMI, 2023). This is in sharp contrast to predicted climate-induced in-mobility on its borders with Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Niger (Penu & Paolo, 2021).

### **Climate, conflict and fragility**


Being a threat multiplier, climate change has harshly impacted communities and could increase the prospect of violent conflict (De Lorenzi et al., 2017). Many world academics and leaders recognise the Sahel as a hotspot for climate-related insecurity if no urgent action is taken (AF, 2024). The most fragile and vulnerable states have limited adaptive capacity. Therefore, stresses driven by climate change could increase the probability of violent conflict without swift action (Tänzler et al., 2010). Fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) are critical issues of development that are hostile to efforts in middle-income and low-income countries to end extreme poverty (Sturridge, 2023). The climate-related crisis has gradually become intertwined with the fragility and conflict

challenges, drawing the attention of both academics and organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) (AF, 2024). Reports from the IPCC and the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) produced in 2021 have highlighted the severe impacts of climate change on areas already confronted with conflict and fragility (Robinson, 2020). Although the grounds for violent conflicts are frequently embedded in climate change, socioeconomic circumstances and governance help as an influential exacerbating factor, amplifying vulnerabilities in such contexts.

Regarding climate finance in fragile situations, the International Committee of the Red Cross policy brief identified obstacles and barriers (AF, 2024). Risk aversion is the concern, with potential financing institutions and donors reluctant to invest in ventures in areas disturbed by conflict and fragility based on perceived risks linked to political instability, security and uncertain investment outcomes. Moreover, the rigid bureaucracy feature of traditional climate finance processes could prove inappropriate for adaptive and fast responses required in fragile states, hindering effective project implementation (AF, 2024). As of 2024, the total number of people living in abject poverty where FCV exists could be more significant than in areas where FCV is non-existent. In 2030, nearly 59 % of the poorest people in the world will stay in states with FCV (World Bank, 2021; World Bank, 2022). Fragility is a multidimensional and intricate concept (Arcagni et al., 2019). The concept of fragility is not yet understood universally, and practitioners, scholars, and policymakers have different thoughts about it. Resilience and fragility are better explained than defined (Bosetti et al., 2016). Fragility does occur if a state is not able to conduct its critical tasks due to the appearance of external and internal dangers. Political, environmental, social and economic risks could all be present (AF, 2024). Indeed, many hazards could add to fragility, but only a few have been established to relate to the breakdown of services and functions (Muggah, 2015). Fragility includes the state's risk exposure and inadequate capacity to cope, absorb, reduce or manage those risks (Chianca, 2008). The breakdown of institutions, violence, humanitarian crises, displacement and other emergencies could all emanate from a condition of fragility. The fragility of a state is closely associated with security concerns at the top of the foreign policy agendas of donor countries (Grimm et al., 2014). Generally, a state's fragility means the country cannot provide public goods and essential services, conceding its legitimacy (de Boer et al., 2016). This deteriorates the economy, threatens livelihoods and amplifies the risk of human insecurity and armed conflict. The five fragility characteristics in Africa are societal, political, environmental, economic and security (AF, 2024).

### Migration in a changing climate

The adverse impacts of climate change could transform into abrupt-onset events like mudflows, tropical storms, coastal floods, tornadoes or blizzards (Hahn & Fessler, 2023). Also, rising temperatures risk causing slow-onset events, which include lower precipitation, loss of biodiversity, desertification, forest and land degradation, ocean acidification, glacial retreat, soil salinisation and rise in sea level, also leading potentially to disasters (UNHCR,n.d). Both slow and sudden-onset events could, consequently, influence human mobility. In 2022, at least 32.6 million people worldwide were displaced owing to disasters and essentially severe weather conditions, and between 3.3 billion and 3.6 billion persons now live in spaces that are highly exposed to climate change (IPCC, 2023). Such vulnerabilities are also influenced by prevailing inequalities linked to resource scarcity, ethnicity or gender (IPCC, 2023). Communities in developing countries that are vulnerable, particularly on the Asian and African continents, are affected disproportionately (McMahon et al., 2021). Regions enormously distressed by climate change, as depicted in Figure 1 below, like Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, are also frequently affected by conflict or political instability (Hahn & Fessler, 2023). Not by coincidence, some of these areas, for instance, in South Asia and East Africa, are important countries that host refugees (Fransen et al., 2023).




**Figure 1:** Regions adversely affected by climate change; *Source:* Hahn & Fessler (2023, p.7)

The vulnerable displaced people staying in the world's largest twenty refugee settlements are much more vulnerable to reduced precipitation and low or high temperatures than the particular national normal, though being similarly at risk of cold and heat waves, including flooding. (Fransen, et al, 2023). Accordingly, the interaction of climate change and conflict situations could trigger

recurrent displacement (Hahn & Fessler, 2023). Even if it were likely to identify exposed populations and vulnerable areas, human mobility could occur on a continuum between forced and voluntary migration (Hahn & Fessler, 2023). Hence, not all the people across all the regions affected by climate change could move. Decisions for migration are determined by several factors, including environmental, economic, demographic, social and political influences, which interrelate with the impacts of climate change (GOS, 2011). Current adaptive capacities and vulnerabilities also have an essential role to play (Beyer & Milan, 2023). Although climate change is not present as the only trigger of migration, it has been revealed to considerably increase prevailing socio-economic challenges that have a critical role in shaping decisions for migration (IPCC, 2022; Desai et al., 2021;). Also, climate change has been associated, through mediating and intermediate factors, with proliferations in onsets of structural violence and conflict, which could be factors contributing to migration (Scartozzi, 2020). Generally, the feedback loop developed by the interfaces of the climate-security-mobility relationship can have destabilising and compounding effects, making people more exposed and likely to migrate in pursuit of safety and stability. Supporting sustainable development and peace-positive climate adaptation is vital in mitigating the harmful effects of the climate-security-mobility link. By dealing with the leading causes of vulnerability, like governance challenges, poverty and lack of access to resources, populations can withstand better slow-onset events—and climate-related shocks. However, much more must be done, particularly on financing adaptation (UNEP, 2023a). Regardless of the urgent need, conflict-affected and fragile regions receive nominal climate finance—just 2.1 USD per capita, contrasted with 162 USD in peaceful nations (UNDP, 2021).

### **Barriers to action in the development sector**

The development sector faces political and conceptual barriers when collaborating with partner governments to expedite migration as an adaptation strategy, as depicted in Figure 2 below (McInerney et al., 2022). Traditionally, migration has frequently been seen as a failure in development, whereas lessened migration is considered a measure of program or project success (Bakewell, 2008). Development projects have a habit of disincentivising migration, desiring to aim at people who are in fixed localities (Tesfaye et al., 2021). In National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), migration has continued to be presented essentially as something to be discouraged and prevented (Chazalnoël & Mach, 2016), showing that migration is frequently ignored in adaptation planning (see Figure 2 below). Politically, migration is regularly viewed as a threat to economic and physical security. Migrants are often accused of taking jobs, grabbing public benefits, and overly draining resources. There are also security concerns stemming from the wrong assumption that migrants have a penchant for committing crimes (Banulescu-Bogdan et al., 2021). The rhetoric of securitisation also supports the notion that scarcity of resources will cause conflict between receiving and sending communities (Hartmann, 2010).



**Figure 2:** Migration challenges as a strategy of adaptation; *Source:* McInerney et al. (2022, p.13).

### **Integrated management of water**

Water is a major instrumental factor in Africa's immobility and climate mobility. For disaster displacement, the highest drivers are drought and flooding (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Slow onset impacts of climate change, including drought and sea-level rise, adversely affect fragile societies and cause immobility and mobility. The scarcity of water is one of the main impacts of climate change. Water scarcity means the economic or physical lack of water resources to serve the needs of people (McFee, 2022). In cases where natural

water resources are excessively exploited, physical water scarcity is an occurrence. On the other hand, economic water scarcity happens if inadequate investment in and management of water infrastructures and distribution systems exists. Reduced rainfall, more extended periods of drought, rising temperatures and the increase in intensities and occurrences of flooding are all impacts of climate change that directly impinge on both economic and physical water scarcity (AfDB & IOM, 2023). Fragility and water access are directly correlated. Since water is a crucial element of household activities, women endure a disproportionate water scarcity burden. They must travel long distances to access water and are vulnerable to increased threats. Men who acclimatise to water scarcity by choosing to migrate frequently leave women behind to countenance the escalation of water scarcity while bearing household and family burdens (McFee, 2023). Water plays a vital role in households, so women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region frequently have an excessive burden in obtaining this essential resource (Klepp & Fröhlich, 2020). Therefore, most encounters concerning water scarcity, including those concerned with conflict and mobility, lean towards disproportionately affecting women. Whereas mobility is inherent to human existence globally, it is often characterised by inequality due to social class, age, gender, race and ethnicity (Klepp & Fröhlich, 2020). For example, the reports produced by humanitarian aid agencies working in MENA countries emphasise the increased vulnerability of girls and women to violence and sexual attack in refugee settlements and conflict zones, where water access often requires walking long distances. Research reveals how out-migration by men could leave behind women grappling with increasing water scarcity while concurrently taking care of children in war-torn and conflict situations (Klepp & Fröhlich, 2020). Ironically, this situation occasionally leads to women taking greater authority within communities and households (IOM, 2023). Women and girls encounter exceptional human security challenges, particularly given that they constitute 80 % of the people displaced due to extreme weather events worldwide (CGIAR, 2023).

### **Increasing impact of rainfall variability on human mobility**

Although environmental changes by and in themselves are essential, the human mobility process, given climate change and the possible concerns, is profoundly entrenched and reliant on a complex set of ecological, social, cultural, political, economic and social factors (Schraven et al., 2020). This explains, for instance, why the forced displacement risk in the wake of climate change is more noticeable in the Horn of Africa – with its essentially fragile conditions and protracted armed conflicts. And under fragile situations like in the greater region of Lake Chad, drought-induced scarcity of water and related mobility results in a higher likelihood of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over limited resources. In the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad and the MENA regions, most households upset by climate change are, as a result, poor and have no primary resources to sustain themselves (Schraven et al., 2020). However, migration also has the potential to adapt to climate change. In most cases, individual members of households migrate for a long time to earn money and mitigate hardships confronted by their families at home (McInerney et al., 2022). This is not, however, a panacea, as challenges like lack of jobs, labour exploitation and harsh economic conditions often undercut this positive opportunity of migration.

### **Policy and climate migration**

Given that climate change acts together with numerous other migration drivers and both effects and causes of mobility work at various levels, multi-level and multi-sectoral policy responses are indispensable (AfDB, 2021). On the other hand, what is observed is a general paucity of interface between institutions at all levels, migration and climate policy actors (Schraven et al., 2020). Also, there is a feeling that migration is considered something to be prevented based on how the subject is handled by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its associates (UNFCCC, 2020). Although in 2010, migration formally got into the negotiations sphere of the international climate, a Task Force on Displacement was set up in 2015. The suggested shorter-term and long-term measures pivot on averting mobility by providing migration alternatives through adaptation processes for vulnerable groups and lessening greenhouse gas emissions (Schraven et al., 2020). This is also widespread in some other transnational policy sectors, platforms or processes related to climate migration, like rural development. The Cancun Adaptation Framework (2010), through paragraph 14(f), calls for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) parties to improve understanding, cooperation and coordination related to climate change-induced planned relocation, migration and displacement, where appropriate, at the international, regional and national levels.

Although the United Nations Human Rights Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have tried to heighten climate migration awareness since the 2000s, some actors and institutions for international migration policy have not been willing to discuss actual policy options. However, the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, as adopted in 2018, may not just synchronise, up to now, the somewhat fragmented and complex global migration governance architecture (UNHCR, n.d; IOM,2023). This could also begin a more dynamic approach to the nexus between mobility and climate. It provides for firm information sharing and joint analysis to plan better, predict, understand and deal with migration issues because of climate change and environmental degradation. This could also be asserted at African national and regional levels for integrating climate and migration policies (Schraven et al., 2020).

### **Research and Methodology**

The study was a systematic literature review to explore and inform practice towards a shared vision of peace, security, migration and climate change in Africa. Global databases, including SCOPUS, EBSCO, Science Direct, Google Scholar and Web of Science host, were used. The aforementioned electronic databases were ideal because they improve multidisciplinary studies, interdisciplinary



climate, mobility, and peace and security analysis. The databases offer more vigorous texts of peer-reviewed journal articles for fundamental research and numerous journals indexed in well-known citation indices. Internationally renowned journals included in this study were listed and accredited by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) of South Africa to ensure that only dependable, credible and trustworthy sources were sampled.

## **Findings and Discussion**

Climate change is a fast-growing cause of human movement, acting together with poverty, demographic change, and conflict. This undermines human well-being, safety, peace, and progress toward sustainable development. The adverse impacts of climate change are felt worldwide, whether indirectly or directly. However, unfortunately, it disproportionately affects those people who least contribute to it, especially the most vulnerable groups who are ever more forced to vacate their homes and abandon their families, cultures and communities. Climate change has become a significant driver of human mobility. The urgency to develop solutions and take practical action for communities to forge ahead, stay, and move on cannot be played down. Millions of people are being forced by climate change to move about inside their affected countries, and millions are expected to turn into internal climate migrants by 2050. With practical actions now, these numbers could be cut by about 80 per cent.

### **The impacts of climate change on food security and conflict**

Environmental changes are the leading agents in the human mobility processes and their likely consequences. However, they are also entrenched and dependent on economic, political, cultural, ecological or other social factors. As a result, for instance, the forced displacement risk because of climate change is most prominent in the Horn of Africa, owing to sustained armed conflicts and a state of fragility, besides in fragile conditions such as the greater Lake Chad region water-scarcity induced by drought and related mobility results in a higher possibility of conflicts over scanty resources between pastoralists and farmers. Most families affected by climate change are poor and lack the resources to move, hence the trapped populations.

### **Policy influence**

The ideal policy to manage human mobility in terms of climate change in the African continent would essentially mean attempting to stop forced displacement and to promote positive mobility aspects like remittances. That would require a multi-level approach jointly developed by numerous policy sectors such as rural development, environment, migration, climate and forced displacement. However, institutions and actors in the context of climate policies, just like other policy sectors, have usually seen migration as an issue to be precluded by mitigating the impacts of climate change through decreasing emissions of greenhouse gas or climate change adaptation processes. So, to make significant developments regarding policy formulation on human mobility in terms of climate change, increased capacity building and a spanning of gaps between various policy areas are required. In the context of Africa, there are some positive indications in that respect: The Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), a consultative process in the region sustained by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), has instituted a Thematic Working Group (TWG) on migration, climate change, environment, desertification land degradation. An additional example is Ghana, whose National Migration Policy has not yet been implemented fully, which takes migration through the lens of climate and environmental change strategy for inter-ministerial cooperation. Open policy opportunities should be availed or promoted, and additional resources should be mobilised to support vulnerable communities and groups. The development of suitable databases and best practice documentation regarding how to deal with human mobility in the context of ecologically vulnerable situations would be critical.

### **Sustainable development impediments**

The main impediments to sustainable development are the displacement, fragility, and compounded impacts of climate change. They confine affected people into a trap of human insecurity and increased vulnerability, leaving them ill-equipped and less resilient to survive future shocks. In some countries like Zimbabwe, these occurrences increasingly happen concurrently with adverse effects on food, water, land systems, and livelihoods. They also interact with pre-existent socioeconomic and political challenges and develop new ones to create social dynamics that produce social cohesion and non-violent community relationships that are not easily sustained and achieved. Understanding fragility, displacement, and climate change interact and support each other to ensure peace and security, which should be a priority of each country and, hence, should be at the epicentre of the framework for the African Union's policy through all sectors. Africa should develop a pathway towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient development economy whereby the population has enough adaptive capacity and continues to develop in harmony with the environment.

### **Evidence-based, responsive approach**

The quest to develop an evidence-based and responsive approach to peace, security, and climate-related risks is essential as Africa continues to face the devastating impacts of climate variability. Compounding conflict and climate-related risks could cause communities and individuals to be considerably constrained regarding their capacity to engage in migration. Improving adaptive capacity helps mitigate the risks of immobility and involuntary migration, eventually giving individuals better agency in their migration choices. Policy interventions have the potential to eradicate and widen the variety of secure, regular, migration and organised options, in so doing, empowering populations that are vulnerable to acclimatise to the challenges caused by climate change (IPCC,2023). On the other hand, households or individuals short of financial capacity or social networks or confronted with significant security risks while on the move could become locked in, thus being forced to continue in areas of frequent climate

vulnerability. Populations staying in these settings are possibly more likely to become allied to armed groups or be sucked into explicit conflict dynamics (CGIAR, 2023). Similar to mobility, immobility in the case of climate change is thought to be on a spectrum, stretching from involuntary to voluntary (Thornton et al., 2023). The latter suggests immobility through choice, while the former represents forced immobility. Individual outcomes and decisions linked to immobility could be influenced by changing levels of resilience and vulnerability. Table 1 illustrates empirical evidence.

**Table 1:** Long Term Impacts of Climate Change on Africa's GDP (% change/year)

Subregions	1° C	2° C	3° C	4° C
North (n=7)	-0.76 ± 0.16	-1.63 ± 0.36	-2.72 ± 0.81	-4.11 ± 0.97
West (n=15)	-4.46 ± 0.63	-9.79 ± 1.35	-15.62 ± 2.08	-22.09 ± 2.78
Central (n=9)	-1.17 ± 0.45	-2.82 ± 1.10	-5.53 ± 1.58	-9.13 ± 2.16
East (n=14)	-2.01 ± 0.20	-4.51 ± 0.34	-7.55 ± 0.63	-11.16 ± 0.85
Southern (n=10)	-1.18 ± 0.64	-2.68 ± 1.54	-4.40 ± 2.56	-6.49 ± 3.75
Whole of Africa (n=55)	-2.25 ± 1.52	-5.01 ± 3.30	-8.28 ± 5.12	-12.12 ± 7.04

Source: ACPC of the UNECA

### Effective strategies

To promote development, regional climate resilience and stability, it is essential to employ effective strategies to improve Africa's adaptive capacity to risks caused by climate change. Some key strategies are recommended to develop peace-positive climate change adaptation while dealing with mobility. These include:

- i. Strengthening the rule of law and multi-level governance: Supporting governance across African countries' migration, climate and agriculture sectors needs an all-inclusive approach that appreciates their interconnectedness.
- ii. Empowering minorities, women and youth as change agents: For adaptation to climate change in Africa, the involvement of minorities, women, and youth brings different socio-economic benefits and perspectives.
- iii. Promoting adaptation to climate through remittances: Leveraging diaspora investments and remittances is critical for fostering climate adaptation and local entrepreneurship in Africa.
- iv. Promoting generation of knowledge and accessibility: Support research on peace and security, human mobility and climate action to improve access to scientific knowledge through consultation with the relevant audiences.
- v. Increasing climate finance towards conflict-affected and fragile settings: Focusing climate finance towards conflict and fragile-affected settings and dealing with the uneven distribution of finances and centres on reaching Africa's most vulnerable populations.

It is imperative to take on adaptation conflict-sensitive approaches and the above recommendations to deal with these convoluted challenges.

## Conclusion

The detrimental effects of climate change in Africa are primarily associated with escalating rainfall unpredictability and intensity, as well as an increased frequency of droughts and floods. These effects constitute a primary challenge to human security. The ramifications of human movement, ranging from circular labour migration to forced displacement, are rooted in a complex and context-dependent array of ecological, political, cultural, social, and economic elements. The potential of forced displacement due to climate change is arguably the most significant in the Horn of Africa, owing to armed conflicts and precarious conditions. Political instability, socio-economic insecurity, and climatic change propel nations to extreme levels of fragility. In predominantly affected areas, these factors are generating grievances that may lead to conflict and organised violence. The interconnection among water, land, and food gives a potential avenue for alleviating these tensions; insufficient opportunities for youth, poverty, and conflict exacerbated by climate and environmental changes compel migration both across and within African regions. Furthermore, the challenge is exacerbated by the absence of a unified vision and integrated long-term governance among policymakers and agencies managing agricultural resources, leading to fragmented efforts in addressing these concerns. Enhancing population resilience in Africa significantly relies on the ability to augment the continent's adaptive capacity to the threats presented by climate change. The management of food systems and resources by communities and governments is essential for the African continent's ability to sustain peace and prosperity. Without peace, there are no opportunities for development. In the absence of development, peace, food security, and economic possibilities cannot be sustained. Africa is especially vulnerable to fluctuating climatic conditions marked by enduring heat waves, droughts, and other catastrophic phenomena. This vulnerability affects economic development, food security, land, and water resources. Climate change has the potential to intensify political instability and socio-economic concerns, leading to displacement and perhaps inciting conflicts and tensions in the most impacted regions, due to the complex interconnections among water, land, food, and agricultural shortages.

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